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Book Reviews
THE COURT YEARS:

1939-1975. By William 0. Douglas. New York:

Vintage Books, 1981. Pp. 434. $5.95 (softbound).
Reviewed by James E. Bondt
The Court Years, the last volume of William 0. Douglas' autobiography, demonstrates that the Justice was exactly what his judicial opinions showed him to be-an irrepressible and opinionated
partisan who could by turns be superficial and profound, disingenuous and candid, cantankerous and charming. His character and
temperment might have made him a charismatic President. They
surely would have made him an eccentric law school dean. That he
narrowly missed both offices and was instead appointed to and remained on the Court for thirty-six years was unfortunate, for he
was singularly ill-suited to judicial office. Uninterested in the craft
of judging and uncommitted to any principled theory of the judicial function, he contented himself with championing those causes
dear to his heart. While the United States Reports thus record his
enthuisiasms on the transient social and economic issues of his
day, his opinions offer no insight into the difficult art of constitutional adjudication. He certainly offers none in this volume of entertaining, anecdotal recollections of persons, cases, and events.
Justice Douglas confides early in this volume that his first Chief
gave him all the insight he needed when Hughes advised him:
Justice Douglas, you must remember one thing. At the Constitutional
level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The
rational part of us supplies the reasons for supporting our predilections.'

The new Justice feigned shock at the advice: "I had thought of the
law in the terms of Moses," he says.2 Douglas was then forty years
old. He had graduated with honors from the Columbia Law School
t A.B., Wabash College, 1964; LL.B., Harvard, 1967; S.J.D., University of Virginia, 1972.
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.
1. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 8 (1981).
2. Id.
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where he had studied under Stone. He had taught at the Yale Law
School during the heyday of legal realism. He had worked with
Tommy Corcoran, Felix Frankfurter, and the other architects of
Roosevelt's New Deal. He had played poker with the President
and his cronies into the wee morning hours during which the old
Court was excoriated for its "horse and buggy" interpretations of
the Constitution. Douglas' claim that he nevertheless still could
not admit to himself that "the 'gut' reaction of a judge.

. .

was the

main ingredient of his decision" is but one of many such disingenuous claims that at points transform his autobiography into a
charming work of fiction.8
From beginning to end, Justice Douglas made his gut reactions
the lode-star of his judicial decision-making. For example, he insistently urged his brethren to take up some one of the Vietman War
protest cases and declare that "presidential war" unconstitutional.4
For him the issue was simple. The war was wrong; ergo, it was unconstitutional. The question of justiciability did not trouble him
because he viewed it as a mere ploy by which the Court could
avoid making the hard (politically hard, that is) but right (morally
right, that is) decision. With his infallible instinct for the moral
jugular of the case, he had no interest in its legal capillaries. Consequently, neither briefing nor oral argument in any particular case
would change his mind. The Justice simply wanted a case-any
case-through which he could vent his outrage at the Vietnam
War. That he could not judicially identify himself with the liberal
side of the most important political question of the late 1960's
must have frustrated the Justice who, both before and after, managed to record in his opinions his sympathy for every other important liberal cause from free speech to free abortions.
For those many declarations of belief in liberal theology he
was-and still is-lionized by his fellow true believers. They hail
him for his courageous and compassionate commitment to social
justice, apparently believing that a Justice is commissioned to do
3. Id. Among my other favorites is his assertion that during his tenure relations among
the Justices were amicable. This was a Court that failed to send a letter to Justice Roberts
when he retired because they could not agree on how much regret to express. This was also
the Court whose private jeolousies exploded into public recriminations when Justice Jackson, who believed that Justice Douglas and Justice Black's private machinations had denied
him the Chief Justiceship, denounced the Justices in a press conference at Nuremburg.
4. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 151-52.
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good in an evil world. A Justice, however, takes an oath to decide
those cases entrusted to him according to the law. That oath
obliges him to labor diligently to ascertain what the lawgiver intended and then honestly to apply the law thus understood to the
particular case before the Court. Justice Douglas liked to pretend
that he himself worked in that very tradition. The Constitution
was not a value free document, he would remind his critics; and he
was merely enforcing "specific constitutional guarantees." 5
Of course, Justice Douglas was correct that the Constitution was
not a value free document. The framers believed in self-evident
truths, and they self-consciously embodied them in the Constitution. They did not view phrases like "due process," "the privileges
and immunities of citizenship," or "republican government" as
vague abstractions. For the framers those phrases had a substantive content which reflected the values born of their experiences.
Ascertaining those values and thereafter resolving a contemporary
case by applying constitutional text in light of those values are
among the most difficult tasks of constitutional adjudication. Justice Douglas never discharged those tasks. He simply assumed that
the framers shared his values and proceeded to construe the Constitution as if he had written it. He doubtless would have winked
in agreement with another Hughes statement: "We live under a
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is."
Justice Douglas said the Constitution was a "plan . . . to take

government off the backs of the people when it came to specified
civil rights."'7 He applied that philosophy with such crude vigor
that he invariably voted against the government in tax cases, for
example. No Hamlet, he. His opinions on obscenity reflected the
same simplistic literalism. Presumably, the right to traffic in pornographic materials was one of the "specific civil rights" for which
the patriots had shed blood. The Justice thus insisted that the first
amendment prohibited local communities from forbidding or otherwise restricting the sale of obscene materials. What the first
amendment says is that Congress shall make no law prohibiting
freedom of speech. Justice Douglas applied the prohibition literally
because that construction fit with his general libertarian beliefs,
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 52-53.
M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (1951).
W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 53.
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not because any evidence suggested that the framers favored a free
market in smut.
Although he claims to have parted company with Justice Frankfurter when his once hero and later nemesis suggested that they
join forces to rewrite the Constitution, he admits joining forces
with his ideological bedfellows Black, Murphy, and Rutledge in the
hope of imposing a libertarian gloss on the document.' Indeed, one
of his great regrets is that what the Justice calls "the libertarian
bloc" failed to prevail. The "bloc" did not fail for want of Douglas'
scheming although he naturally denies conniving like "Felix the
fixer." Swelling with pride he declares: "I was probably the one
Justice in the long history of the Court never to proselytize." 9 The
statement is astonishing, first, because he could not have known
how most of his predecessors on the early Courts behaved and, second, because his own descriptions of his relationships with his colleagues belie the statement. His vain posturing, as in the Rosenberg case, 10 may have compromised his politicking; but he worked
as hard as any of his result-oriented colleagues to put together a
five person coalition.
Even those who dismiss resort to the lawgiver's intent as hopelessly naive or inevitably futile must have reservations about result-oriented adjudication as Justice Douglas practiced it. A court
which believes that the social utility of its decision alone legitimates it must still articulate a rationale for the result. A legal system cannot function efficiently or justly unless the rationale of the
law is coherent and intelligible. Writing that kind of opinion is
hard work, and Justice Douglas refused to do it. Indeed, what he
came to prize most about his job was that it demanded so little of
his time that he could devote himself to his "many other interests." 1 His cavalier attitude toward opinion writing is best revealed in his own account of Justice Brennan's travail in Baker v.
Carr:
The Conference vote on whether the question of reapportionment was
"political" rather than "justiciable" was five to four. Justice Stewart was
one of the five, though his vote was tentative, dependent on whether

8. Id. at 28, 95.
9. Id. at 88.
10. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989 (1953).
11. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 4.
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thorough research and a close analysis of the cases would disclose that
the question was not foreclosed by prior decisions. If it had been previously decided that the question was "political," he was inclined to follow
precedent and not change course in such turbulent times and on such a
controversial issue.
Chief Justice Warren assigned the opinion to Justice Brennan on the
theory that if anyone could convince Stewart, Brennan was the one.
Brennan worked long and hard on the opinion, its length being due to
the exhaustive and detailed examination of precedents which he undertook. When he finished the first draft he showed it to Stewart, who approved; and there was a broad Irish grin on his face when he told me that
the fifth vote was secure. He then circulated the opinion and quickly obtained the concurrence of the Chief, Black and myself. The dissents were
circulated; and just before the Conference at which Baker v. Carr was to
be cleared for Monday release, Tom Clark circulated a concurring opinion. Without talking to anyone, he had changed his mind and written a
short concurrence, which, if it had happened earlier, would2 have made
Brennan's long, scholarly but tedious opinion unnecessary.

If Justice Douglas' sole ambition was to avoid the stigma of writing
tedious opinions, he achieved it. He was no more tedious than he
was conscientious. Justice Douglas' harsh description of Justice
Jackson's opinions in fact describes his own opinions far more
accurately.
He loved to write essays and publish them as opinions, not necessarily to
illuminate a problem, but to embarass or harass a colleague. In that
sense he was petty, but some of his opinions are enduring and contain
ringing declarations of the democratic ideal."3

Justice Douglas seemed not to understand that the rule of law
inevitably depends at some point on the rule of men, and that in
our system that point occurs when the Court exercises its power of
judicial review. We have staked our faith on the ability of life-tenured judges to exercise that power fairly, honestly, and responsibly.
Justices like Black and Frankfurter struggled manfully to articulate a theory of judging that would reconcile the Court's power of
judicial review with democratic theory. Long after succeeding
generatons have stopped debating the substantive merits of Baker
v. Carr14 (reapportionment) or Griswold v. Connecticut5 (privacy),
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 32.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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they will still study Frankfurter's and Black's respective dissents
in those cases because those Justices addressed not only the merits
but the only enduring question in American constitutional law: the
proper role of the judiciary in a free society. Justice Douglas' sole
contribution to that question was to say in effect that it didn't
make any difference. And that is why, in the end, he didn't make
any difference.

HeinOnline -- 1982 Det. C.L. Rev. 208 1982

